1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

647 and sale of tobacco products; the Customs Department; all these likewise were of no direct concern to the Wali. The same applies to the rare public works entrusted to the wilaya engineer, and to the Department of Pious Bequests (Awqaf) The Wali could venture on no official interference in the Oman-Ottoman Administration, none in the favoured Saniya. The last-named had, by 1900, acquired for its master by favourable 'purchase' almost one-third of the cultivable lands of Baghdad wilaya, and very large estates in Baṣra and Mosul.

701 The VIth Army, whose territorial area was coterminus with 'Iraq, was reckoned as the least excellent of the main Turkish formations. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, and a formation of artillery. The units of every arm were widely scattered, and constantly changed station according to the needs of the tribal warfare. Transport was hired for the occasion, supply and medical arrangements were primitive, equipment was shabby and deficient. The staffs and organization of the Army were in general those of modern forces; but the troops were misused, discipline was lax, pay irregular. Service with the Army was
702 by conscription, from which non-Muslims and many classes of Muslims were free on payment; tribesmen were wholly exempt. Compulsory service was commonly prolonged beyond the legal three-year period, and this, with the liability to be sent to a grave in the Yaman or Europe, combined to make conscription of all Turkish institutions the most resented. Nevertheless, no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of higher standard, than did 'Iraq.

706 The Navy at Baṣra, a puny and decayed service, was commanded by a commodore. Its ostensible duty was that of river police, in which it signally failed. With a shore establishment of some two hundred, its only craft in 1900 were an ancient corvette unable to leave its moorings, the *Kilid al-Bahr*, and a small armed paddle-steamer, the *Alus*.

642 This Turkish Government of 'Iraq, at whose task, evolution, and organization we have now glanced, had irreproachable nominal objectives—order, progress, and public advantage. Its regulations were comprehensive and repeatedly revised: its administrators contained men of education, experience, and knowledge of local conditions. It was, nevertheless, severely criticized by its own servants and not less by outside observers. Excessively centralized, it was bound by a thousand ill-applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill-served, ill-housed, ill-equipped, and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs. It lacked a breed of loyal and vigorous men able to grasp the essentials of ruling a backward tribal territory, and trusted by their superiors.

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for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intrusion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Bequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

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factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

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published in December 1920 involved a general restoration of Turkish administrative units, with the temporary loss of improvements made in 1918 to 1920. It involved also the complete separation of judicial from executive functions, an innovation—or restoration of Turkish methods, in this case salutary—which led to the immediate need at all levels for more judges and magistrates; and these the Ministry of Justice, progressive from the first in the use of responsible 'Iraqis, was not unsuccessful in supplying. The 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams who, except in Sulaymaniya liwā and with caution on the middle Euphrates, were now everywhere substituted for British Political Officers and their Assistants as the effective governors of the provinces, represented all types, all ages, and all degrees of merit and honesty among ex-Turkish officialdom. The almost exclusively Sunni Government followed Turkish tradition by making, it was remarked, no Shi'i appointments save, inevitably, in the Holy Cities. The new provincial régime which allowed initially for 10 liwās, 35 qaḍhās, and 85 naḥiyas, was the most obvious indication to the public that an 'Iraq Government was now a reality. It incorporated in each liwā one or more British officers as Advisers (later, Administrative Inspectors), an arrangement which promised to work on the whole satisfactorily and to the credit of both elements. There were in places regrettable lapses to Turkish standards, and elsewhere signs of administration on lines of political partiality; at Mosul the incoming Mutaṣarrif was promptly murdered; and in some cases the 'Iraqi executive, more experienced and not less able than his British supervisory colleague, resented the relationship. But on the whole the new machine worked with general acceptance and little friction.

Progress was made early in 1921 towards the construction of an 'Iraq Army. It was intended firstly for the defence functions which must devolve upon it with the withdrawal of British forces which, already in progress, was vociferously urged by press and politicians in Great Britain; and, secondly, to offer employment to the potentially dangerous military caste. To absorb the existing Levies, now a force over 2,000 strong with excellent discipline and record, into the 'Iraq Army would involve fundamental changes in the former, with the replacement of almost all its officers by newcomers. This plan was rejected; the Levies were instead placed temporarily under the Minister of the Interior, and retained a separate existence. The Ministry of Defence spent the first half of 1921 in elaborating departments, a staff, terms of service, and all other preliminaries for the Army. Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id, brother-in-law of Ja'far Pasha and himself a brilliant officer and pre-1914 'Iraqi patriot, returned from Syria to become its Chief of Staff. A Military College was opened in July 1921.

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was H. F. Forbes, I.C.S., in 1920–1, B. H. Bell in 1921–2, and thereafter G. Alexander until 1934. Davidson on transfer to the staff of the High Commission handed the Adviserships of Justice in 1922 to E. M. Drower, who held it till 1946. The Turkish Majalla, Code of Civil Procedure, and Commercial and Maritime Codes remained in force. Criminal justice was in the hands of single magistrates with first, second or third-class powers, and Courts of Sessions which possessed also appeal jurisdiction, while limited magisterial powers were still possessed by certain administrative officials and municipal bodies. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, beloved of administrative officials but disliked by the legally-minded. The rights of foreigners, preferential though no longer Capitulatory, were defined in the Judicial Agreement. Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a Bar Association for the body of excitable, ill-disciplined advocates, into whose numbers the Law School poured annual recruits.

The forces of law and order were at this period four in number: the 'Iraq Army, British forces of ground and air, the 'Iraq Levies, and the Police. The 'Iraq Army, based on voluntary recruitment from 1921 onwards and within its limits conceived on the most modern lines, by 1925 rose in strength to 7,500 men. It remained constant at about this establishment for the next eight years. There were six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, two mountain and one field battery, and all necessary services. The officers had almost all served in the Turkish Army, but in the lower ranks at least were adaptable to new standards. Units of the Army took part in many small operations against tribal enemies and saw more serious service in Kurdistan, not without losses. Great attention was paid to its Training Centre and its Royal Military College. The British Military Mission was re-formed and increased in 1925.[1] By this date the Army's rôle of successor, for all ground purposes, of the British forces was clearly indicated. The latter were progressively reduced, actually to vanishing point in 1929. In March 1921 there were 33 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry regiments, 16 batteries, and Sapper and armoured-car companies: these by 1926 were reduced to three battalions, two by 1927, one by 1928, and vanished entirely in 1929. The British military element, so characteristic of 'Iraq under the Occupation, was thenceforward to be absent until 1941. The Royal Air Force—under successive commanders of high rank, nearly all of whom were

[1] Successive heads of the British Military Mission, and Advisers to the Ministry of Defence, were: Colonel P. Joyce, 1921; Major-General A. C. Daly, 1925; Major-General G. G. Loch, 1928; Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, 1931; Major-General C. J. Bruce-Hay, 1934; Major-General H. W. M. Watson, 1937; Major-General G. G. Waterhouse, 1938; Major-General D. G. Bromilow, 1941; Major-General J. M. L. Renton, 1944.

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destined to attain fame in the Second World War—remained to render invaluable help to the 'Iraqi authorities on many occasions. These willing services, and the personalities of the Air Officers Commanding,[1] were largely invisible to, and unthanked by, the 'Iraq public. The strength rose from four squadrons in 1921 to six and then eight in the period 1922 to 1926, then was reduced again to five and to four squadrons in 1928 and 1930. Their most frequent collaboration was with the Levies.

This latter force which, with changes of location and organization since its scattered early beginnings, had shown remarkable steadfastness in the dark days of 1920, took its place early in 1922 as a British-paid and British-commanded force[2] at the disposal, for all purposes helpful to the 'Iraqi authorities, of the General Officer (later Air Officer) Commanding. Late in 1922 the Levies contained three cavalry regiments, two Kurdish and one Assyrian; one Kurdish, two Assyrian and marsh-Arab infantry battalions, and an Assyrian pack-battery. The total strength of the force was some 7,500, its officers British, Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish, its record already creditable in tribal and mountain war, and its value obvious as a relief for outgoing British garrisons in northern 'Iraq. It was unfortunate that, through differences of loyalty and character, feeling between the Assyrian element in the Levies, which became largely predominant in its later years, and the 'Iraqi authorities was never cordial. But their services to 'Iraq were in fact valuable and respected, and the economic advantage of Levy service to the Assyrian community was important.

The 'Iraq Police grew during these years into a force generally admired for their high efficiency and good morale. Everywhere under 'Iraqi executive command, assisted and inspected by Prescott and his excellent officers, they were well selected, equipped, trained, and officered; and though crime might still occur almost unchecked in outlying tribes, the Police assumed the duties of the old Shabana, penetrated more deeply than ever before into rural districts, patrolled the routes, supported administrative officials, and collaborated on active service with the military. Specially adapted forces, camel-riding or equipped with armoured cars as need dictated, were organized for desert work in the Jazira, the

[1] The commanders of British forces in 'Iraq from 1922, when Royal Air Force was substituted for Army command, until the Second World War were: Air Vice-Marshals Sir J. Salmond, 1922; Sir F. A. Higgins, 1925; Sir E. L. Ellington, 1927; Sir R. Brooke-Popham, 1929; E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 1931; C. S. Burnett, 1933; W. G. S. Mitchell, 1935; C. L. Courtney, 1937; J. H. S. Tyssen, 1939; H. G. Smart, 1940.

[2] Successive commanders of the Levies, from their first organization as a single formation, were: Major C. A. Boyle, 1920; Colonel-Commandant G. R. Frith, 1921; Brigadier-General L. W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, 1921; Colonel H. T. Dobbin, 1922; Brigadier J. G. Browne, 1926.

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Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions.

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Ḥarir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian—continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Maḥmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

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563 repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retro-
701 spect, to be regretted.

The announcement of the impending end of the Mandate pro-
563 foundly disturbed the Assyrian community, which under the 1930
668 Treaty was so shortly to be left at the sole mercy of the 'Iraq Government. The latter's attitude, though still correct, was growing less favourable. Taxation remissions were granted on a decreasing scale; normal minor taxation, outrageous to the long-pampered settlers, was beginning to be demanded; and Government action in admitting parties of destitute Assyrians from Russia was reluctant and unpopular. Persistent British support for Assyrian claims, or part of them, was galling to successive Cabinets. Worse than this, the exploitation of bad relations between Kurd and Assyrian appealed to certain Baghdad politicians as an easy method of trouble-making. It bore fruit in a series of untraced murders and revived anti-Assyrian outcry among the Kurds. Nevertheless, if the Assyrian community had, with patience and avoidance of provocation, accepted its new position in 'Iraq—which was that or better than that of the Chaldaeans or Armenians—its future could have been peaceful if inglorious, its ecclesiastical and social individuality preserved, and its homes secure and happy. But its leaders chose other paths, which led to tragedy. They clung to every point of their reiterated case: that they had been officially 'allies' in the 1914–18 War, but as such never rewarded; that their Levies had performed outstanding services—indeed had acquired and saved southern Kurdistan; that the League had in 1925 recommended rebestowal of their 'ancient privileges', now still withheld; that the British had ruined their hopes of Turkish favour and resettlement in Hakkari, and had betrayed them at Geneva. The twenty-year-old Ishai Mar Sham'un, at school in England from 1925 to 1929 and wholly ignorant of 'Iraq realities, was unfitted to guide the community and obsessed by unrealistic conceptions. Chief among these was that of the 'temporal power' which he felt to belong to the headship of a Millet almost self-governing in olden days, however unacceptable and unconstitutional it must be in modern 'Iraq. His father was ultra-conservative; in his aunt, Surma Khanim, the fervour of community feeling had by now vanquished judgement; the bishops and maliks failed in wisdom or pursued sectional aims, and in conspicuous cases even led factions against their Patriarch. Enthusiastic well-wishers from outside—one an Anglicized grandson of Layard's assistant, Hormuzd Rassam, and one an Englishman, Matthew Cope—misused their well-meant influence to organize petitions, to raise false hopes, and further to prejudice Assyrian-'Iraqi relations.

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ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and inefficiently in 1928, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils two years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1932 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School: a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was discontinued; but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited 'Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1923 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later amendment. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1930 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al-Bayt closed its doors in 1929. The Law School, 'Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1930, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 8 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership to Education in 1930, and was not replaced.

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: a fifth or more of Government income maintained the 'Iraq Army, and nearly a sixth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1926 to four in 1930, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the 'Iraq Army; no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve these. The Royal 'Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1930, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1932, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1930, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1926 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in

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the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services. Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force, some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security. In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inaccessible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechanization of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

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The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a broader activity which should include the rural and backward areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal improvements and considerable building and town-planning. Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934, devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imperfect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength. Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken

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646 665 The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

000 Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of [668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

• 701 Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563 The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemployment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active operations could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

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exchanged; and even this support had to be limited when, at the League meeting in April, the member States indicted Jordan for alleged negotiations with the Jews. The task of justifying the incorporation of the Arab remainder of Palestine into the Jordan Kingdom (a step to which in practice no alternative appeared) was difficult to reconcile with the desirability of placating Egypt. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the League meeting in April voted for a resolution declaring Palestine to be a 'trust territory of the whole League', and in May for another which declared Jordan's act of unification a breach of the principle thus established. He then with difficulty secured postponement of the decision to expel the Hashimite Kingdom, and succeeded in substituting a compromise formula acceptable to all save Jordan herself, asserting that Palestine should, after complete liberation, be disposed of by a collective decision of the League.

Disunity was not less evident in connexion with the Collective Security Pact proposed by Egypt in 1949. The Pact was not for many months accepted by 'Iraq, whose spokesmen saw little value in an agreement which did not include Jordan; but this clash of views, unresolved by the end of 1950, did not prevent the 'Iraqi Premier from offering his verbal support to Egypt in her current diplomatic struggle with Britain. With Israel the successive Governments in Baghdad continued to refuse all negotiation; and the Cabinet, with the implacable politicians of other States, professed to see a new threat of 'imperialism' in the would-be sedative declaration of Britain, the United States, and France on 25 May that they were opposed to the use of aggressive force by any Middle Eastern State, including Israel, and would supply thenceforward only the armaments necessary to each country's defence. The declaration was accepted by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with reserves which he was at pains to indicate to the British and American Ambassadors.

The year 1950 was peaceful in Kurdistan. There was no sign of Mullā (or Marshal) Muṣṭafā's return, though the wireless campaign from the Soviet Armenian 'Post of the Kurdish Democratic Party' persisted; and 'Iraqi policy in Kurdistan, where Nuri Sa'id in conciliatory mood toured in September 1950, seemed to show increased sympathy with its wayward Kurdish subjects, and there were less frequent schoolboy outbursts in Sulaymaniya. In the Police the former Director-General, 'Alwan Ḥusayn, had resumed command after an attempted coup (it was said) had led to the dismissal of 'Ali Khalid, and the force regained their discipline and prowess. The Army, still dissatisfied with the equipment provided for it and with the fewness of cadet vacancies made available in England, tried genuinely to improve its efficiency, sought in vain

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

701 American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow
631 start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available.
665 Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when
668 they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

563 If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 692 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 697 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them.

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the Dhafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed.

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175* 642 727 652 surplus of 5 lacs was reported when items properly chargeable to the two regimes existing in the financial year had been taken into consideration.[1]

The future was not brightened by the necessity of providing immediately for defence and for the maintenance of order, on a scale larger than anticipated at first, due to the unexpectedly rapid withdrawal of British troops. Defence forces in 1921-2, exclusive of Levies, the cost of which was assumed by H.M. Government, were to cost Rs. 127,09,455,[2] whereas in the previous year they had cost Rs. 88,50,000 inclusive of Levies.[3]

175* 642* 727* 701 Although Defence Forces for the time being took the form of Levies and Police, the Council had provided, on January 6th, 1921, the nucleus of an 'Iraq General Staff, with Major J. I. Eadie as temporary Adviser until the arrival of Col. P. C. Joyce in April. The creation of a national army was stimulated by the necessity of absorbing as far as possible, the large and articulate group of unemployed and discontented ex-officers from the Turkish army. The problem was further aggravated by the acute jealousy between the ex-Sharifian and ex-Turkish officers. Many of the latter would take no office and publicly predicted the early return of the Turks.

The entire question of the development of the defence forces, together with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq were among the principal questions brought before the Cairo Conference in March, 1921.

[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 23.
[2] *Budget of 'Iraq Government*, 1921-1922 (Baghdad, 1921), Ch. viA, viB, vii, pp. 10, 12.
[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
9raq MH1

Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

to accept their stay in Iraq as more than temporary. Secondly, even if they had to remain in Iraq, they wished to go on living the same sort of independent life under the Mar Shimun as they had lived before the war. They were not satisfied with the privileges which they shared with other minorities; they claimed complete autonomy, and their claims were expressed in the most intransigent form by the Mar Shimun himself. Finally, they distrusted the Iraqi Government, and regarded themselves as in a special way the protégés of the British Government; when the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was signed, they thought themselves to have been abandoned by their protectors, and feared the worst. Their fears were intensified by the work among them of a small group of agitators. 563 641

Nor was the Iraqi Government more satisfied with the situation. It resented the special position accorded to the Assyrians, no less than the refusal of the Assyrians to be contented with their position as citizens of Iraq. What is more important, it feared them. Throughout the mandatory period, Assyrian Levies had been trained and used by the British authorities for guarding aerodromes as well as for the repression of the Kurdish revolts. They had proved to be good soldiers; both they and the Iraqis believed that they would be more than a match for the young Iraqi Army. After 1930 they were gradually disbanded, but they retained their arms, and the Iraqi Government feared that in view of the prevailing discontent among the Assyrians they might revolt and the revolt would be difficult to crush; it feared also that the British Government might instigate a revolt, as an excuse for recovering control over the country. 701 563

By the summer of 1933 tension between the Assyrians and the Government was very great. Although some of the former were willing to come to terms with the Government, others, the foremost among them being the Mar Shimun, were still demanding autonomy; and asked, if this was not possible, to be allowed to cross the frontier into Syria. Relations between the Mar Shimun and the Government had reached such a state that he was not allowed to return from Baghdad to the north. The Government and the Army were becoming increasingly frightened of the possibility of a revolt, and resolved, if given an opportunity, to end the danger once and for all. King Feisal and several of the more experienced Ministers were away in Europe, and the 563 641 669

probably at the instigation of the Agha, because he was held to have corrupted the morals of the youth. 11 K 609

Health services need not concern us. In the area studied there is no resident doctor outside the city of Erbil. 758

The Government have made various experiments in agricultural reform chiefly with a view to improving the breed of livestock and the quality of valuable crops such as tobacco. The Government's interest in the improvement of the tobacco crop is especially relevant to the area here described. Details will be discussed later but it may be pointed out that Government assistance of this kind is not a philanthropic enterprise. The heavy excise duty levied on all saleable tobacco much more than repays any expenses incurred. Iraq 635 K 249

The independent judiciary functions through its court in Erbil. In practice however it is in the nature of appeal court, since in the first instance cases come before the Mudir (sub-district magistrate) and then before the Qa'im Maqam (district magistrate) before being referred to the court. I am not clear as to the rules governing "appeal" of this sort, nor as to the limits of sentence that can be imposed by the magistrates' courts. So far as I know, only serious cases such as homicide automatically go before the court at Erbil. Iraq 635 692

During time of peace the military are stationed only at Erbil and Rowandus. There appears to be a general attitude of suspicion and conflict as between the civil and the military authorities. In this area the civil service is staffed mainly by Kurds and Turks and is thus in general inclination Kurdo-phil. The army on the other hand is staffed mainly by Iraqi-Arabs whose hatred and fear of the "barbarous Kurd" can be taken for granted. 635 701 ● K 578

The liwa is divided into several districts (khasa) each presided over by a district magistrate (Qa'im Maqam). Area A, Map 1 with which this account is mainly concerned lies wholly within the khasa of Rowandus. The Qa'im Maqam is responsible for his district in much the same way as the Mutasarrif is responsible for his liwa. Iraq 635

The khasa in turn is subdivided into several sub-districts (nahiya) over which presides a Mudir. The Balik tribe all reside within the nahiya Balik - the administrative district in this case coinciding with the tribal one. Dergala on the other hand is administered from Rowandus.

The Mudir has in his direct control a number of policemen who provide the direct liaison between the external authority and the tribe. It is the venality of these junior officials which is the worst feature of the system, and which is the real source of Iraq 635 625